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Since the 1980s, many countries have experienced a sharp increase in house-
hold debt. However, aggregate data on the indebtedness of the household sec-
tor conceal substantial variation in the distribution of ﬁxed-income assets across
households. For example, in 2004, around half of households in the United States
had (nominal) mortgage debt, while around 20% of households were holding no
debt at all. This implies very different exposures to interest rate and inﬂation
risks, which usually are far from being perfectly hedged. In a recent contribution,
Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that a moderate inﬂation episode would lead
to a substantialredistributionofwealth because ofchanges inthe valueof nominal
assets.
Despite this evidence, much of the recent literature on monetary economics
disregards the heterogeneity in households’ asset holdings and focuses on design-
ing the optimal response of the monetary authority to business cycle ﬂuctuations
in presence of nominal frictions—for example King, Khan, and Wolman (2003)
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). A distinctive conclusion, recurrent in this
framework, is illustrated by the recent work of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
They show that, even in a rich medium-scale model with a large variety of fric-
tions, price stability remains the central goal of monetary policy.1
The present paper takes a new approach. While still focusing on business
cycle and the role of nominal frictions, we depart from the baseline sticky-price
model by introducing cross-sectional distribution of household-assets and relax-
1There are clearly exceptions, for example when indexation to past inﬂation or strong wage
rigidities are introduced—see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000).
2ing thecompletemarketassumption. Thisis equivalenttoa modelinwhich agents
hold heterogeneous portfolios with different exposures to interest rate and inﬂa-
tion risk. The main implication is that the policy maker’s welfare-based loss func-
tion includes an extra target variable in addition to those typically found in the
literature (inﬂation and output gap): the cross-sectional distribution of household-
consumptions. In other words, introducing heterogenous nominal bond holdings
entails the central bank’s effort to minimizeconsumptiondispersion across house-
holds. 2
This implies a departure from previous results of the literature in two respects.
First, thanks to its ability to affect interest payments’ volatility, monetary policy
has real effects even in a ﬂexible-price-cashless-limit environment. Second, even
in a setup with nominal rigidities, price stability is no longer optimal. In other
words, introducing debt-burdened households creates a trade off between inter-
est rate reactions meant to stabilize prices and those meant to stabilize the debt-
service volatility. In fact, the volatility of interest payments introduces a source of
idiosyncratic uncertainty at the household level, which, in turn, is welfare reduc-
ing.
In order to assess if our model provides a reasonable description of the data,
weperform acalibrationexerciseusingmicrodatafromtheFederal ReserveBoard
of Governors’ 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. Our analysis suggests that an
2The study of optimal monetary or ﬁscal policy when agents hold heterogenous nominal as-
set positions is not a novelty in the literature. Akyol (2003) ﬁnds that, in a model with liquid
and illiquid assets, positive inﬂation can improve risk sharing and, therefore, welfare. Albanesi
(2007), studies how taxes and the inﬂation are set in a political bargaining game between rich and
poor households holdings different portfolios of nominal assets. In this case, distributional con-
siderations may determine a positive relation between inﬂation and income inequality. However,
the aforementionedliterature fails to put together welfare analysis and business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Moreover, it allows no role for monetary policy stemming from nominal rigidities.
3equivalent model with symmetric asset positions is not well suited for welfare
analysis.3 In fact, under the optimal policy, the existence of asset heterogeneity
would implyan inﬂation volatilityequal to 20% oftheobserved inﬂationvolatility
of thelast 15 years. An importantimplicationis that a high dispersionin the initial
ﬁxed-income assets distribution does call the price stability goal into question.
Finally, the study examines simple implementable rules and ﬁnds that a su-
perinertial rule, i.e., a rule that reacts to lagged interest rate with a coefﬁcient
greater than one, is the second-best policy choice. Such a rule allows the mone-
tary authority to have a hump-shaped path for interest rate responses to exogenous
shocks. This reduces the volatility of interest rate disbursement but, at the same
time, quickly pushes inﬂation toward zero.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section lays
out the model and shows the corresponding equilibrium conditions. Section 3
introduces the welfare criterion. Section 4 looks at the problem of the monetary
policy maker. Section 5 and 6 contain the calibration and the results, respectively.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are found in the appendices.
2 The Model
The baseline model is a cashless-limit, dynamic, sticky-price model with com-
mon factor markets and no capital accumulation (Clarida et al., 1999; Gali, 2002;
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, 1999).4 There are households which buy con-
sumption goods, supply factors of production, and can trade in ﬁnancial markets
3Even if, for a given policy rule, it may still constitute a reasonable approximationfor studying
the behavior of aggregate quantities.
4See Woodford (2003) chapter 2, for a discussion of a cashless-limit economy.
4forassets. Theproductionsidefeatures ﬁrmsthatare imperfectcompetitorsfacing
infrequent opportunities for price adjustment.
We depart from the standard framework in two respects: Markets are incom-
plete, and the initial distributionof nominal assets across households is not degen-
erate.5
The two sources of uncertainty are the level of total factor productivity, A,
and the level of real government purchases, G. The government can ﬁnance the
exogenous stream of public consumption with lump-sum taxes, TG. In period 0,
the government is also able to implement a redistributive transfers scheme, ¯ t, to
favor wealth equality but cannot change it after that period.
The monetary authority controls the short-term nominal interest rate, R, takes
the redistributivescheme as given, and can commit to a state-dependent rule. This
ruleallowsthemonetary authoritytorespond to all oftheeconomy’srelevantstate
variables.
In this section, we describe the equilibrium conditions, with households and
ﬁrms solving dynamic optimization problems for a given transfer scheme and
monetary policy rule.
2.1 Households
We assume a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1], maximizing the util-
ity
5The initial distribution is calibrated using the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2004
Survey of Consumer Finances, section (5). From a modeling point of view, one could have a non-
degenerate distribution of assets across agents, introducing idiosyncratic income or preference
shocks at the household level. However, for tractability reasons and because these shocks are















and b is the intertemporal discount factor, with b ∈ (0,1). Households get utility
from the consumption index Ch and disutility from hours worked Nh. Assume
that v(.) : [0, ¯ N+) → R is twice continuously differentiable with v′ > 0 and v′′ >
0; moreover, given some d > 0, j ≡ vnnN/vn is at least approximately constant
for N ∈ I( ¯ N,d), where j can be interpreted as the inverse of the Frisch labor
elasticity.6 The risk-aversion parameter s is strictly positive.
ConsumptionindexC isdeﬁnedasaDixit-Stiglitzaggregateofdifferentgoods











Pt(z) denotes the price of good z and P1−q
t =
R 1
0 Pt(z)1−qdz deﬁnes the aggre-
gate price index that is consistent with the optimal allocation of a given expendi-
ture among the different goods. Optimality implies the following good z demand
schedule: ch
t (z) = [Pt(z)/Pt]−qCh
t .
The budget constraint takes the form
PtCh
t +Bh




Each household h earns a nominal wage of Wt per hour worked and enters
6Inarepresentativeagenteconomy,havingnoupperboundforhoursworkeddoesnotrepresent
a serious concern. However, when there is a continuum of heterogenous agents, the possibility,
for a single household, of supplying an unbounded number of hours, while leaving the wage
unaffected, is not realistic and would place no natural limit on debt.
6period t with nominal ﬁnancial wealth Bh
t−1. The variable Xh
t is a lump-sum com-
ponent of income: It summarizes government tax (transfer) Th
t and proﬁts from
ﬁrms Fh
t . In the same period, each household h buys (sells), at the market price
Qt, a portfolio of nominal ﬁxed-income assets that pays $1 tomorrow. A value
Bh
t < 0 means that household h is a net debtor.
In period 0, ﬁrms’ shares are evenly distributed across households and are
not subsequently traded, hence, Fh
t = Ft, where Ft is the total amount of proﬁt
made in the economy.7 Th
t can be divided into an aggregate tax TG
t , needed to
ﬁnance current government spending Gt, and a household-speciﬁc transfer ¯ th that
is constant over time. The additive component now reads Xh
t = ¯ th−TG
t +Ft.
Assets can be sold short only if they will almost surely be repaid. We thus
introduce the natural debt limit,
Bh
t /Pt ≥ −fh
b. (2)
The value fh
b can be interpreted as the maximum level of debt a household can
repay, allowing the consumption plan {Ch
t }¥












7The trading restriction imposed here on stocks may not be innocuous, given the absence of
complete ﬁnancial markets. However, more than one concern has prevented us from introducing
this additional feature. First, a sticky-price model is not well suited to describe ﬁrms’ proﬁt be-
havior over the business cycle (see, for example, Christiano et al. 1997). Second, it would blur the
focus of the analysis on ﬁxed-income assets.
72.2 Firms
We assume a continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a differentiated good with a
technology
yt(z) = AtNt(z), (3)
where (log) productivity log(At) follows a Markov-stationary stochastic process.










The government has the same consumption aggregate as the private sector, G,
and it demands the same fraction, tG
t , of the output of each good produced gt(z)=
tG
t yt(z), which implies Gt = tG
t Yt. Hence, we can write the resource constraint as
Ct +Gt =Yt, (4)
andthedemandfunctionforeachdifferentiatedgoodasyd
t (z)=[Pt(z)/Pt]−qYt.
Employment is subsidized at a constant rate 1−tµ. All ﬁrms face a common
real marginal cost, which in equilibrium is given by mct =
Wt/Pt
At tµ.
Firms are monopolistic competitors and are allowed to change prices with a
Calvo probability 1−y.
Firms’ objective function is to maximize expected proﬁts discounted by a
stochastic discount factor Lt,t+j. In general, this is a function of each individ-
ual discount factor Lh
t,t+j.8 The optimal pricing policy is
8In principle, each household shareholder h would like to have ﬁrms maximize discounted
proﬁts using its own stochastic discount factor Lh
t,t+k. However, if managers have delegated a










mct+k] = 0. (6)
It has a simple interpretation: Firms set prices at a level such that a (suitable)
weighted average of anticipated future markups matches the optimal frictionless
markup q/(q−1).9 A log-linear approximationof the optimal pricing deliversthe
standard relation between inﬂation and expected marginal costs that is at the heart
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
pt = bEtpt+1+kmcmct, (7)
where kmc ≡ (1−y)(1−by)/y and pt is the inﬂation rate.
2.3 The Government and the Monetary Authority
The government runs a balanced budget in each period and government consump-
tion is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes, Gt = TG
t .
A constant redistribution scheme across households, t, is implemented in pe-
riod 0 such that we have
R 1
0 thdh = 0.
We assume that the monetary authority can control the (gross) funds rate, Rt.
This is perfectly inversely related to the price of the nominal riskless portfolio
described in section (2.1),
relative price P
h,⋆















9For a derivation and interpretation of ﬁrms’ optimality condition, see Woodford (2003) or
Gali (2002), among others.
9Qt µ 1/Rt.
We also assume that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is never
binding under the optimal policy regime.
2.4 Sources of Inefﬁciencies
The ﬁrst source of inefﬁciency derives from the presence of infrequent price ad-
justments. All goods enter the utility function symmetrically and are produced
with the same technology: Efﬁcient would require allocating the same amount of
resources to producing each good. However, when y > 0, a fraction of ﬁrms is
committed to satisfying all the demand for a ﬁxed, previously posted price. In the
presence of inﬂation, this induces amisallocationofresources in theeconomy that
can be captured by Dp,t =
R 1
0 [Pt(z)/Pt]−qdz, ameasure of relativeprice dispersion.
To identify the second source of inefﬁciency, we introduce a term (an analog
of Dp,t) that captures thehouseholds’inabilityto insuretheir asset positionagainst
interest rate and inﬂation volatility. Taking the stand of debtors, we refer to the
latter as volatility in the reﬁnancing cost, which is low in period of high inﬂation
and high in periods of high interest rates. When the reﬁnancing cost is high,
debtors’ available resources decrease and debtors relatively increase their labor
supply to smooth consumption over time. Hence, given that all households have
the same preferences and ability, a measure of labor supply dispersion is a good





t /Nt)−j/s ≥ 1. (8)
10This term appears in the aggregate consumption/leisure conditions and repre-
sents a shift in the labor supply.10
It is worth notingthat, in thecase ofcompletemarkets, hoursdispersionwould
be a constant Dn,t = ¯ Dn, households’ consumptions are perfectly correlated, even
though they may have different levels. This makes ˆ Dn,t = log(Dn,t/¯ Dn) a good
measure to capture the implications of insufﬁcient ﬁnancial instruments.11
We refer to the output prevailing under ﬂexible prices and complete markets
as the efﬁcient output, Ye
t , to distinguish it from the output prevailing under only
ﬂexibleprices,Y
f
t , whichismonetary-policydependent. Theoutputgapisdeﬁned
as the log difference of current output to efﬁcient output, x ≡ log(Yt/Ye
t ).
It is also useful to introduce the efﬁcient rate re
t which is the ex ante real
rate prevailing under ﬂexible prices and complete markets. This is an exogenous
process function of technology and government spending shocks.12
3 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we lay out the problem of a benevolent policymaker reacting to
aggregateexogenousdisturbanceswhentheeconomyispopulatedbyacontinuum
of households featuring a nondegenerate distribution over nominal asset holdings.
His objective is to maximize a welfare function W which aggregates agents’





tegrating with respect to h and using hats for logs gives ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt = j ˆ Nt +s ˆ Ct −sˆ Dn,t
11In case of perfect wealth equality, we have ¯ Dn = 1.
12It can be easily shown thatYe
t andY
f
t have the following expressions: ˆ Ye
t = s
s+j ˆ gt +
1+j
s+j ˆ At +
s
s+j log ¯ Dn and ˆ Y
f
t − ˆ Ye
t = s
















where h(h) : [0,1] → R+ represents a time-invariant weighting function.
When transfers are conveniently chosen (and the long-run inﬂation target is
zero), the model economy oscillates around the efﬁcient and socially desirable
allocation for any arbitrary initial asset distribution and weighting function h(h).
This is a necessary condition for a direct derivation of a purely quadratic welfare-
based loss function. In this case, without loss of generality, we weight every
household the same, h(h) = 1, and choose å
¥
j=0bj¯ th = ¯ bh, ∀h. This last ex-
pression implies that, in the non-stochastic steady-state, the government transfer
exactly offsets the asset position of each household, i.e., we impose steady-state
wealth equality.
Alternatively, if no transfer scheme can be implemented, there is always a
positive weighting function h⋆(h) that can recover the solution of the complete-
markets version of the model, where idiosyncratic risk is perfectly insured and
consumptionsareperfectly correlated across households.14 Thisalternativewould
deliver the same results as those that we derive in the next sections.
Both approaches would make the central bank accept initial (and long-run)
13Qualitatively, the results do not depend on the welfare criterion chosen; in fact, the less utili-
tarian the welfare function, the stronger the results.
14The function h⋆(h) can be calculated using the inverse of each household’s initial marginal
utility. We normalize this function such that we can use steady-state consumption, i.e., h(h) =
1/u′( ¯ Ch). To see this let ˜ h(h) = 1/u′(Ch
0) and use the following normalization:











12wealth inequality. Loosely speaking, this is equivalent to a monetary authority
that accepts the wealth distribution in statu quo nunc.
3.1 The Welfare-based Loss Function
We now present the second-order approximation of the policy objective, equation
(9), about the deterministicRamsey steady-state, i.e., the efﬁcient and socially de-
sirable allocation.15 Details of the derivation can be found in appendix Appendix













t )2+o( St−1 2). (11)
The presence of staggered prices introduces gains from minimizing inﬂation
and the output gap. Relative price dispersion implies a misallocation of resources
that is captured by the term p2
t +lxx2
t : price rigidities generate no trade-off be-
tween output gap and inﬂation stabilization.17
The third target variable that enters the loss function is the cross-sectional
consumption dispersion. This term induces a trade-off between inﬂation/output
15It can be proved that optimal policy would choose a non stochastic steady-state with
å
¥
j=0bj¯ th = ¯ bh and zero relative price dispersion. See Woodford and Benigno (2003) for a proof
of the optimality of zero inﬂation in a sticky-price model.
16The approximation error is strictly related to our variables’ deviations from their steady-state
values, and  St−1  represents a bound on the amplitude of exogenous shocks and the deviations








in section (2.4), redistribution is captured by the volatility of the labor supply









(1−tG)j]. This has a very simple interpretation: The stricter the concavity of the
household utility function (higher risk aversion and/or lower labor elasticity) the
greater the weight a social planner should put on wealth redistribution effects.18
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In thissection, we analyzein greater detailtheroleplayed by monetary policy. We
show that, even if the monetary authority accepts the initial wealth distribution,
the central bank still plays a crucial role in offsetting the potential redistributive
impact of aggregate shocks on the household budget constraint. Moreover, we
will clarify why households’ stock of assets becomes a source of idiosyncratic
uncertainty, which, in turn, is the source of volatility for our distortion Dn,t.
4.1 The Private Sector Equilibrium System
Having a purely quadratic loss function, we can evaluate optimal policy using the
ﬁrst-order Taylor approximationof the privatesector problem presented in section
18The steady-state level of government consumption decreases the weight simply because it
lowers the steady-state level of private consumption.
142.19
We deﬁne assets’ deviation from their long-run values as ˜ bh
t ≡ bh
t − ¯ bh; the
consumption and employment cross-sectional gap is ˜ Ch
t ≡ logCh
t /Ct and ˜ Nh
t ≡
logNh
t /Nt; exploitingthat ¯ th =−¯ bh(1−b), we can reformulate the agent h budget
constraint in deviations from average quantities (see Appendix D) as
kc ˜ Ch
t = ˜ bh
t−1−b˜ bh
t + ¯ bhxt, (13)
where kc = 1+ s
j and xt ≡ b ˆ Rt −pt is (the log-deviation of) the unit real reﬁnanc-
ing cost, extra-reﬁnancing cost. As we mentioned earlier, it should be read as a
cost for a debtor to keep his today’s (negative) ﬁxed-income real ﬁnancial wealth
constant when the interest rate rises; note that ˆ Qt = −b ˆ Rt. For a creditor, it would
more properly be read as a reinvestment cash ﬂow.20
Hence, deviations of household h consumption from average consumption,
˜ C, are due either to changes in the real asset positions ˜ bh
t−1 −b˜ bh
t or to changes
in ﬁnancial income ¯ bhxt.2122 The latter is the channel through which aggregate
uncertainty introduces idiosyncratic risk at the household level.
19Caveat emptor: A local approximation of this model may not be accurate. Prices are not
affected by the evolution of the wealth distribution. However, three points make us believe this
should not be a major concern: There are no reasons to have kinks in the policy functions—the
natural borrowing constraint should never be binding; there are no purely idiosyncratic exogenous
shocks—the ranking of households across asset holdings is constant over time; and, ﬁnally, for
the ﬂexible-price case, as we show in the appendix, the solution of the full-ﬂedged model delivers
the same outcome as the approximatedmodel. For furtherreadings, see Krusell and Smith (1997),
Den Haan (1997) and Young (2005).
20More precisely, it would represent the extra real investment income netted from the “reinvest-
ment” necessary to keep the real stock of assets constant.
21More precisely, ˜ bh
t−1 −b˜ bh
t is the real cash ﬂow change derived by changing the real asset
position (the dimension of the portfolio), keeping real ﬁnancial income constant at its long-run
value 1−b.
22Moreprecisely,xreferstorealcashﬂowchangesstemmingfromchangingreturnsbutholding
the total stock of assets constant at its long-run value. Hence, x measures the unit impact of a
change in returns.
15We conclude the description of the system by taking a log-linear expansion of
the households’ Euler equation in deviation from aggregate levels,
EtD ˜ Ch
t+1 = −jb˜ bh
t . (14)
Equation (14) introduces the ad hoc term jb˜ bh
t with jb > 0. It captures the
quasi-random-walk behavior of bt in the original non linear model, which disap-
pears under a local approximation. Moreover, it can be interpreted as a convex ﬁ-
nancial adjustment cost that further reduces the households’ ability to self-insure.
In any case, jb > 0 can be taken arbitrarily small (see section 5 on calibration).23
Thankstolinearity,wecanclosethesystemusingtheaggregateEulerequation
and the Phillips curve:
sEtDxt+1 = ˆ Rt −Etpt+1−re
t (15)
and
pt = bEtpt+1+kxt, (16)
where k ≡ (s+j)kmc.
4.2 The Monetary Policy Problem
This section examines the policy problem that the monetary authority faces in
committing to a state-contingent path for the short-term rate {Rt}¥
t=0.
23Alternatively, this can be microfunded by imposing small quadratic adjustment costs on debt
transactions. For a related discussion see Schimtt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). See also Kim, Kim
and Kollmann (2005) on barrier methods to convert an optimization problem with borrowing con-
straints as inequalities into a problem with equality constraints, and then solving the converted
model using a local approximation.
16We assume that the central bank has full information in setting its instrument.
The information available at time t is captured by the all-relevant-time-t state of
the economy: The exogenous process re
t (which captures all exogenous uncer-
tainty), the set of endogenous state (˜ bh
t−1)h∈[0,1], and a set of costates, denoted Lt,
associated with the constraints introduced for satisfying equilibrium conditions
dated t < 0.
Hence, thecentralbank’sproblemistochooseprocesses{pt, ˆ Rt,( ˜ Ch
t )h∈[0,1],(˜ bh
t )h∈[0,1]}t≥0
to minimize (10) subject to constraints (A-29), (14), (15), (16) for every t ≥ 0,
given initial conditions (˜ bh

















s.t. pt = bEtpt+1+kxt
sEtDxt+1 = ˆ Rt −Etpt+1−re
t
kc ˜ Ch
t = −b˜ bh
t + ˜ bh
t−1+ ¯ bh(b ˆ Rt −pt), ∀h ∈ [0,1]
EtD ˜ Ch
t+1 = −jb˜ bh
t , ∀h ∈ [0,1]
(˜ bh
−1)h∈[0,1] given.
The system of necessary conditions is shown in the appendix. Here, it is worth
introducing the following deﬁnitions:
24We do not necessarily need to assume that the optimal policy honors commitments made in
the past—referred to as timeless perspective. Whenever (˜ bh
−1)h∈[0,1] = (0)h∈[0,1], there is no ad-
vantage that monetary authority wants to exploit at time-0. In a closely related setup, Khan et al.
(2003) introduce, in the standard (unconstrained) Ramsey problem, lagged Lagrange multiplier
correspondingto the forward-lookingconstraints in the initial period, making the problemstation-
ary. The initial values are chosen to be the steady-state values. For a discussion, see also Benigno
and Woodford (2005).





• the consumption-debt covariance: wt ≡
R 1
0 ¯ bh ˜ Ch
t dh
• additional debt dispersion: zt ≡
R 1
0 ¯ bh˜ bh
t dh.
We can express the consumption-debt covariance in terms of its correlation
wt = r˜ c¯ b
t zb
p




2jˆ Dn,t/s. Furthermore, notice that, given the nature of our “idiosyn-
cratic” shocks, the household ranking across assets has no reason to change over
time. This means that, at each point in time, there is a monotonic relation be-
tween ˜ C and ¯ b. The relation takes a positive (negative) sign when the realized
and expected reﬁnancing costs, x, are penalizing the group of debtors (creditors).
Hence, we may want to write wt/zb ≃ sign(r˜ c¯ b
t )
q
2jˆ Dn,t/s. This tells us that the
volatility of wt is an important statistic for the welfare impact of changes in the
reﬁnancing costs, xt, and we are going to show that these two variables are strictly
related.
Taking a linear combination of budget constraints (A-29) and Euler equations
(14), and using the previous deﬁnitions, we can write
kcwt = −bzt +zt−1+z2
bxt, (17)
EtDwt+1 = −jbzt. (18)











where a ≤ 1 is a function of the structural parameters.25
The above equations also show that the systematic component of monetary
policy has redistributive effects on welfare. Monetary policy may affect house-
hold wealth through current and future changes in the reﬁnancing cost, x. In
particular, the lower is 1−ab (ability to self-insure) and the higher is zb (initial
asset dispersion), the larger is the impact of x’s volatility on wt/zb.
The variable zt captures how the asset distribution is changing over time with
respect to the initial one. A positive (negative) value for zt means that on average,
households that started with a debt (credit) have been worsening (improving)their
asset position even further. Moreover, 1−ab > 0 implies that zt−1 is positively
correlated with wt, i.e., households that have accumulated a stock of debt that
exceeds their long-run average are experiencing below average consumption.
4.3 A Special Case: The Flexible-Price Environment
When prices are perfectly ﬂexible, y = 0, there is no relative price dispersion,
Dp,t = 1; hence, inﬂation and output gap drop out of the loss function, which




The Phillips curve (16) is no longer well deﬁned, given that marginal costs
25We also have that limjb→0a = 1 and ¶a/¶jb < 0
19are constant. The deviation of ﬂexible-price output from the efﬁcient is relevant
for welfare but not for ﬁrst-order dynamics. This means that the IS equation (15)
simply says that the ex ante real rate is exogenous: ˆ Rt −Etpt+1 = re
t .
We state the following proposition (a proof is given in the appendix):
Proposition 1 In a ﬂexible-price environment, where the only distortion is cre-











, ∀t ≥ 0, (21)








, ∀ t ≥ 0. (22)
The optimal interest rate reaction is a function of inﬂation, pt, and debt dis-
persion, zt. The coefﬁcient on inﬂation, being of order 1.01, satisﬁes the Taylor
principle but is much smaller than standard prescriptions. The potentially redis-
tributive effects of persistent expected increases in the exogenous real rate re
t are
offset by a rise in current inﬂation, which reduces the real stock of debt. The
persistence and volatility of re
t determine the magnitude of the rise in inﬂation.
Currentinﬂationalsooptimallyreacts totheadditional-debt-dispersionzt−1/z2.
A positive value would rise inﬂation aimed to reduce the “excess” real stock of
debt. 27 This means that the central bank, looking at zt, is able to identify which
of those two groups, debtors or creditors, is experiencing a wealth increase.28
26For a deﬁnition of targeting rules, see Svensson (1999) or Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
27Recallingthedeﬁnitionofzt,thesteady-statedispersionz2
b inthepolicyrulecanbeinterpreted
as a scaling parameter.
28We also notice that the optimal rule, given any z−1, would always imply zt = wt = 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
205 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the structural parameters of the model.
Theﬁrst part ofthis sectionis focused on determiningtheinitialdistributionof
nominal ﬁxed-income assets across households, which our model takes as given.
The objective is twofold: to determine the net asset position of each household
necessary to evaluate the welfare loss and to calibrate the asset-dispersion param-
eter zb.
The rest of the parameters represent preferences and technology, and are cali-
brated following the conventional approach of the business cycle literature.
5.1 Household-Level Data




−1dh using microdata from
the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 2004. We
calculate the net asset position for each household in the survey. The gross credit
position is computed as the sum of the following items: Money market accounts,
saving and call accounts, CDs, directly held pooled investment funds, saving
bonds, directly held bonds, and quasi-liquid retirement accounts.29 On the other
hand, we proxy the liabilities as the sum of debt secured by primary residence
and other residential property, other lines of credit, credit card balances after last
payment, installment loans, and other debt.30 The net debt is given by the alge-
braic difference between the credit and debit gross positions. The inclusion of
29The SCF codes are MMA, SAVING, CALL, CDS, NMMF, SAVBND, BOND, and
RETQLIQ, respectively.
30The SCF codes are NH MORT, HELOC, RESDBT, OTHLOC, CCBAL, INSTALL, and
ODEBT, respectively.
21Table 1. Second moment of the net ﬁxed-income assets to yearly income distribu-
tion










In the ﬁrst column we use directly the weights attached to each observation given by the SCF. In
the secondcolumnwe sample 1,000householdsusing the normalizedweights as probabilities. All
zero income observations have been dropped.
quasi-liquid retirement accounts substantially increases the ﬁrst moment of the
distribution but it does not fundamentally alter its shape.
Consistently with the model, we divide the net asset position by the total
household income.31 Table 1 reports the second moment of the net-assets-to-
income distribution during the last six survey years. This is calculated by us-
ing both the weights assigned to each household by the SCF (ﬁrst column) and
by sampling 1,000 households from the survey, using the normalized weights as
probabilities (second column). Because the total sample of the survey is around
4,000 observations, the second method smoothes outliers.32 In any case, the dis-
persion increases across years. This is described in greater detail in table 2, where
the percentiles of the asset-income distribution are shown across years.
31We dropped zero-income observations, which ranged from 0.5% to 1% of all respondent
households during the survey years.
32All the tables show the stock of assets over yearly income, whereas the model’s simulations
and exercises consistently use assets over quarterly income.
22Table 2. Percentiles of the net ﬁxed-income assets to yearly income distribution
over time
Percentiles 2004 2001 1998 1995 1992 1989
10% -2.58 -1.77 -1.82 -1.86 -1.60 -1.41
20% -1.43 -0.91 -0.98 -0.96 -0.87 -0.76
30% -0.68 -0.40 -0.49 -0.45 -0.39 -0.36
40% -0.28 -0.12 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10
50% -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
60% 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
70% 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.13
80% 0.68 0.93 0.90 0.61 0.59 0.50
90% 2.34 2.99 2.43 1.97 1.82 1.74
99% 12.21 10.98 10.31 10.12 8.50 8.43
We sample 1,000 households using normalized weights as probabilities. All zero-income obser-
vations have been dropped. Households surveyed for 2004 numbered 4,498, excluding those with
zero income.
5.2 Preferences and Technology Parameters
As is common in the business cycle literature, we let the relative risk aversion and
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity parameters take values in the following range:
s ∈ [1,5] and j ∈ [0,3].
The time is one quarter, and we assign a value of 0.9902 to the subjective
discount factor b, which is consistent with an annual real interest rate of 4% (see
Prescott, 1986).
We set the steady-state share of government purchases at ¯ tG = 20%, matching
the U.S. historical experience in the postwar period. Following Sbordone (2002)
and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), we assign a value of 2/3 to y, the fraction of
ﬁrms that cannot change their price in any given quarter. This value implies that
on average, ﬁrms change prices every three quarters. The price elasticity of the
demand q is set to 11 such that the steady-state markup is 10%.
23We set the ﬁnancial adjustment cost parameter to jb =10−6. A possible func-
tional form for the adjustment cost is quadratic jb(bt −b−1)2/2. In this case, a
household with an initial (yearly) debt-to-income ratio of 4 that decides to repay
all its debt in a given period would incur a ﬁnancial cost of about 0.0004% of its
income. For the median-income household, this would mean about $0.12. For
jb = 10−4 this is about $12. We believe those numbers are still relatively small.
We estimate the parameters of the the driving processes At and gt, ﬁtting an
AR(1) process for labor productivity and real government consumption expen-
diture quarterly data series from 1990 to 2006.33 We ﬁnd the point estimates
of the persistence parameters to be ra = .89 and rg = .94, respectively, while
the standard deviations of the correspondent innovations are sa = .00670 and
sg = .00164. The two processes are assumed to be uncorrelated. Table 1 summa-
rizes all the parameters just described.
6 Results
6.0.1 Model Dynamics under the Optimal Rule
We now analyze the optimal responses to a transitory disturbance in the level of
productivity and government spending, which is summarized in the reaction of
the efﬁcient rate, re
t .
In the baseline sticky-price model without asset dispersion, the stabilization
policy would be straightforward: tracking the natural rate and closing all the gaps.
33More precisely, the labor productivity is the SA nonfarm business output per hour, while
government expenditure is a fraction of total consumption. The productivity and government
spending series are detrended using a band-pass ﬁlter (6,32) and a cubic trend, respectively. The
90% conﬁdence bands are relatively tight.
24Table 3. Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Description
b .9902 Subjective discount factor (quarterly)
s 2 Relative risk aversion
j .1 Frisch elasticity
q 11 Price elasticity of demand for a good-variety
µ .10 Firms’ markup
y .75 Fraction of non-resetter ﬁrms
¯ tG .20 Steady-state value of government consumption over GDP
zb 16.66 Fixed-income asset dispersion
rA .89 Serial correlation of (log) of technology process
rG .94 Serial correlation of (log) of government spending process
sA .00670 Std. dev. innovation to (log) of technology
sG .00164 Std. dev. innovation to (log) of government consumption
fb 1E-6 Bonds adjustment costs
However, as ﬁgure 1 shows, the higher the debt dispersion zb, the bigger the
deviation from price stability.34
When a positive persistent shock to re
t hits the economy, indebted households,
anticipating higher real rates in the future, reduce their consumption below the
average, wt > 0. To mitigate this effect, optimal policy aims to reduce the impact-
response of real extra-reﬁnancing cost xt by reducing the funds rate and letting
inﬂation raise. In fact, at the time of the shock’s impact, the nominal interest rate
does not move together with the natural rate; the reaction is much smaller. We
have an inversion of sign for the baseline calibration, i.e., for zb ∈ [15.77,18.31]:
The nominal rate decreases at the time of the shock (in both cases the interest rate
gap Rt −re
t is negative). On the other hand, the (log) price level drifts away and
34We let the debt-dispersion parameter take two values: Our calibrated value 16.66 (high) and a
“trimmed” value 2.34 (low), which are the solid lines and diamonds, respectively, in ﬁgure 1. The
low value is determined by trimming the tails (the lowest and highest 5%) of the distribution.
25converges at a higher value, implying a permanent effect on the real stock of debt.
The initial reduction in the reﬁnancing cost generates a windfall ﬁnancial in-
come that allows the debt-covariance to be negative at impact, z0 < 0: Indebted
households reduce their stock of real debt. However, given that price dispersion is
a social cost, this favorable condition lasts for one period; in order to smooth their
consumption, debtors will start accumulating new debt in an effort to reduce the
impact of higher interest payments on consumption.
Figure 2 plots simulated series for the reﬁnancing cost and efﬁcient rate, to-
gether with the disaggregate series for debt deviations from the long-run level, ˜ bt,
debt in level bt and consumption log-deviations from average consumption ˜ Ct, for
a subset of the households surveyed in the 2004 SCF.35 At the disaggregate level
the previous results are also conﬁrmed: Periods with a positive extra-reﬁnancing
costimplyafurtheraccumulationofdebt(credit)fordebtors(creditors)and, given
market incompleteness, a relatively lower (higher) consumption.
In fact, the distribution of net assets and consumption across households ﬂat-
tens during periods of higher reﬁnancing costs. Figure 3 shows how the estimated
density functions of the simulated series (ﬁgure 2) vary over time in periods of
high reﬁnancing costs.36 Both distributions’ tails increase remarkably.
In ﬁgure 2, the reﬁnancing cost shows much less persistence than the efﬁ-
cient rate, even though it is more volatile. The monetary authority tries to strike
a balance between stabilizing prices and reducing debt-servicing volatility, x; it
35More precisely, we draw 1200 households using as probabilities the normalized weights that
the survey attributes to each entry. We then plot a subset of 30 households. Plotting a higher
number of households would not add further insights.
36For clarity, we take a window of time between period 140 and period 250. In that range, the
average reﬁnancing cost is close to 0.005. This is equivalent to an annual real rate of 5%, which is
2% higher than the 3% long-run rate. For these plots, we use all the 1,200 households sampled.
26may well be that reducing the volatility of x is too costly in terms of inﬂation
stabilization. In this case, it is still possible to reduce the persistence of x and
increase welfare (see also equation 19). This result also appears in table 2, where
the estimated autocorrelation coefﬁcient for x is almost zero, while under price
stability it would be as high as 0.86. The reason, as we know from the incomplete
markets literature, is that a lower persistence of idiosyncratic shocks enhances
households’ ability to self-insure.37 Hence, optimal policy achieves a Pareto im-
provement through a drastic reduction in the autocorrelation of the reﬁnancing
cost, improving households’ ability to smooth consumption over time.
6.0.2 Optimal Simple Rules
To give practical, implementable policy advice, we also study optimal simple
rules, restricting monetary policy rules to a class of “simple” functional forms
ˆ Rt = hr ˆ Rt−1+hppt. (23)
The above rule dictates a reaction of the nominal rate to the lagged nominal
rate and inﬂation, both of which are easy to observe.
We maximize with respect to the coefﬁcients of the rule, hr and hp, over a
grid.38 Under the baseline calibration, the optimal simple rule has a superiner-
tial component, i.e., hr > 1, while still showing a strong reaction to inﬂation (see
ﬁgure 4A). The same is true when we increase the cost of renegotiating the ini-
37See Hugget (1993) and Marcet and Singleton (1999), among others.
38The initial grid is [0,3]×[1,300]for hr and hp, respectively. For that range, no indeterminacy
issues arise. We subsequently have a ﬁner grid on a neighborhood of the optimum previously
found. We distinguish for two cases: the baseline fb = 1E −6 and fb = 1E −4. The ﬁner grids
are [0.90,1.25]×[3.00,6.00]and [0.90,1.25]×[1.80,4.00],respectively.
27tial debt, fb; however, the reaction to inﬂation is smaller. The higher the cost
of changing the asset position, the greater the burden of readjustment borne by
consumption relative to bond holdings. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Thanks to superinertiality, the optimal simple rule can closely replicate the
system’s response to a real rate shock under the optimal rule (see ﬁgure 1 and
ﬁgure 5). This is also conﬁrmed by the welfare analysis of the next section. A
reactiongreaterthanonetotheprevious-periodrate, Rt−1, allowsthemonetaryau-
thority to have a hump-shaped path for the interest rate. This reduces the volatility
of interest-rate disbursement and, at the same time, promising even more diverg-
ing rates in the future, can quickly push inﬂation toward zero.
Contrary to the optimal rule, the best simple rule maximizes welfare through
a reduction in the reﬁnancing cost’s volatility (see table 2). In fact, no simple
functional form can reduce the autocorrelation coefﬁcient of x, which now is even
higher than the efﬁcient rate.
6.0.3 Welfare Comparison
The following section compares alternative policy rules in terms of unconditional
expected welfare.39 Table 4 deﬁnes the rules compared; tables 5 and 6 rank each
rule according to its welfare score.40
39To compute it, we generate 200 paths for the endogenous variables over 220 quarters, dis-
carding the ﬁrst 100 (i.e., 40 years) and then compute the average loss across all simulations. All
initial aggregate-state variables are set to zero. To calculate the consumption dispersion, we draw
1,200 households’ initial net-asset position from the 2004 SCF, and then center the distribution on
zero.
40In principle, we could have drawn a sample equal in size to the U.S. household population.
This has not been done for two reasons: One is simply computational; the second is that a number
of households, possibly higher than that of the SCF sample, would increase the probability of
having outliers in the welfare calculations. Hence, selecting a higher number of households would
most probably strengthen the results. On the other hand, using too few households for welfare
calculations (say, less than 200) has been found to strongly underestimate the welfare loss related
28Under the baseline calibration (see table 5), the optimal rule (GOMP) and
the optimal simple rule (OSR) give similar results: The percentage loss of the
estimated rule with respect to the optimal is around 25%. Pure inﬂation targeting
would be fairly suboptimal, with a loss 50% higher than the optimal. In this case,
inﬂation and the output gap are perfectly stabilized (see the relevant rows in table
5), but at the cost of a much larger variation in wt and zt, which in turn represent
the varh( ˜ Ct) and so the welfare loss from consumption dispersion. On the other
hand, a rule showing a standard reaction of 1.5 to inﬂation and of 0.5 to output
gap (TR) would imply less redistribution but too much inﬂation variability. In this
case, the welfare loss would be several times the optimal.
Themagnitudeofthelossescanbeapproximatelyexpressedintermsofsteady-
state aggregate consumption (see second row of table 5). If we take aggregate
consumption to be $9 trillions for a population of 300 million, the loss of business
cycles under the optimal rule would be about $2 per capita, whereas under the IT
rule it would be about $3. Only under the TR rule could it reach something near
$25.
6.0.4 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility
Wetrytosummarizealltheresultscalculatingtheimpliedoptimalinﬂationvolatil-
ity that we would obtain under the baseline calibration and optimal policy. As
shown in table 1, the model is able to generate almost 20% of the inﬂation volatil-
ity of the last 15 years. This number is further increased to 30% when ﬁnancial
frictions are relatively higher, fb = 1E −4.
to consumption dispersion.
29Table 1: Optimal Inﬂation Volatility
Model Data Ratio
GOMP (jb = 1E −4) 0.1184 0.4342 27.26%
GOMP (jb = 1E −6) 0.0832 19.17%
OSR (jb = 1E −4) 0.0784 18.05%
OSR (jb = 1E −6) 0.0503 11.59%
The inﬂation volatility in the data has been calculated taking the standard deviation of quarterly,
annual rate, data on the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank’s trimmed-mean CPI inﬂation rate from
1992 to 2006. For the same period, the CPI all-items inﬂation volatility was 1.52
7 Conclusion
Most of the results in the recent monetary policy literature have been derived
under the assumption of a representative household or complete markets. The
present paper relaxes these assumptions and shows how market incompleteness
renders households vulnerable to changes in interest rates and inﬂation when they
different types of portfolios of nominal ﬁxed-income assets.
An implication is that business cycle ﬂuctuations—in aggregate economic ac-
tivity and in the price level—endogenously introduce idiosyncratic uncertainty at
the household level. In other words, economywide aggregate disturbances gener-
ate unwarranted redistributivepatterns across agents that we are welfare reducing.
In this new scenario, we show that the standard recommendation of price sta-
bility is no longer optimal. In fact, in the presence of zero inﬂation, the nominal
rate would absorb all business cycle ﬂuctuations, implying a highly volatile and
persistent process for interest payments. The main result is that systematic mone-
tary policycan achieveaPareto improvementbyreducing eitherinterestpayments
volatility or persistency, or both.
30We calculate the magnitude of the deviation from price stability through a
calibration exercise and we show that the optimal inﬂation volatility would be
equal to almost 20% of the observed inﬂation volatility of the last 15 years.
Finally, when simple-implementable-rules are analyzed, superinertial rules
outperform other rules. In fact, superinertial rules can generate hump-shaped
interest rate responses to shocks that, in turn, reduce interest rate and interest
payments volatility.
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34Appendices
Appendix A Some Results
In a second-order approximation, for any variable x ∈ R+ and ¯ x ∈ R+
x−¯ x
¯ x ≃ ˆ x+.5ˆ x2 (A-1)
(x−¯ x
¯ x )2 ≃ ˆ x2, (A-2)
where ˆ x = log(x/¯ x).
Given a function of the kind f(x,y) = xg(y), with y ∈ R+, g(.) twice differen-
tiable and ¯ x = 0,
fy(¯ x,y) = ¯ xg′(y) = 0,
fyy(¯ x,y) = ¯ xg′′(y) = 0.
This means that if we take the second-order approximation of f about (¯ x, ¯ y)
∀¯ y, we ﬁnd that
f(x,y) ≃ g(¯ y)x+g′(¯ y)x(y− ¯ y) = g(¯ y)x+ ¯ yg′(¯ y)xˆ y. (A-3)
To calculate the effect of price and output dispersion on overall output, we use
the following result for a household or ﬁrm variable, say x(h), in deviation from












This also means that
Z 1
0
ˆ xt(h)− ˆ xt ≃ −0.5
Z 1
0
(ˆ xt(h)− ˆ xt)2. (A-5)
We note that the ﬁrst-order effect is zero.
In relation with the previous result, if we let xt(h) = Xt(h)/Xt and we have
¯ x = 1 and
R 1
0 xt(h) = 1, then Dx,t =
R 1
0 xa
t (h) can be approximated as





Appendix B Recursive Equilibrium
Let Zt = (At,tG
t ) be the vector of exogenous economy wide stochastic processes
and Ft be the measure (cumulativedistribution)of households over asset holdings
at timet. The law of motion concerning Ft is described by the function f(.), such









represent the price dispersion in the economy. In the case of infrequent possibili-
ties of readjusting prices, Dp,t−1 becomes a state for our economy.
Wecannowintroducetheaggregatestatevectorforthiseconomy,wt =(Zt,Ft,Dp,t−1,Lt),
and the individual state vector, sh
t = (bh
t−1,Xh
t ,wt). The role of the aggregate state
is to allow agents to predict future prices and monetary authority actions. The










The policy function for asset investment is b′ = b(s).










such that i)V and b solve (??); ii) the pricing functions, together with a law of mo-
tion for the price level, solve the resetting ﬁrm problem; iii) there is consistency
between aggregate variables and summing up of agents’ optimal choices, i.e., F
generates bond market clearing
R 1
0 b′dF = 0 and labor market clears.41
Appendix C Output Gap
We have deﬁned the efﬁcient rate of outputYe as the one prevailing with complete













41A formal proof of the existence of an equilibrium for an economy very similar ours can be
found in Miao (2005).
37The introduction of nominal rigidities does not alter any fundamental relation
except the markup determination. So we still have that ˆ mct = ˆ Wr
t − ˆ At, from the
consumption/leisure choice ˆ Wr
t = s ˆ Ct +j ˆ Nt, from the resource constraint ˆ Yt −
ˆ gt = ˆ Ct. However it does alter output aggregation of the production functions
Yt = AtNt/Dp,t, such that consumption (in logs) is given by
ˆ Ct = ˆ At + ˆ Nt + ˆ gt − ˆ Dp,t. (A-10)
So we can write
ˆ mct = (s+j)xt +jˆ Dp,t. (A-11)
For our market structure, we cannot exploit the aggregate consumption/leisure
relationdirectly. However,eveninthesticky-pricecase, theaggregateconsumption-
labor relation found in section (??) must hold:
ˆ Wr
t = j ˆ Nt +s ˆ Ct −sˆ Dn,t. (A-12)
Moreover, it is always true that ˆ Wr
t = ˆ mct+ ˆ At and that aggregateconsumption
is related to output as in equation (??). Combining those two relations with (??)
and using the output gap deﬁnition xt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ Ye
t , we get
ˆ mct = (s+j)xt +jˆ Dp,t −s(ˆ Dn,t − ˆ Dn), (A-13)
as in equation (??) of the text.
38Appendix D The Optimal Deterministic Steady State
Here we show the existence of an optimal steady state, i.e., of a solution to the
recursive policy problem deﬁned in section (2.5), which involves (under appropri-
ate initial conditions) constant values for all variables, in the case of no stochastic
disturbances: At ≡ ¯ A and (without loss of generality) Gt ≡ ¯ G = 0.
To prove the result, we split the problem into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the
government sets and commits to a redistributive policy Ft, taking as given inﬂa-
tion, price dispersion, and total production–i.e., Rt = R⋆, Pt = P⋆, Yt =Y⋆ wt =




We accordingly redeﬁne the momentary utility
u(Ch
t )−v(Nh
t ) = ˜ u(Ch
t ) (A-14)




We can now formulate the deterministic version of the Ramsey problem for










t /R⋆ = bh
t−1/P⋆+¯ th+g(Ch
t ) ∀h ∈ [0,1]
R 1





We denote the associated set of Lagrange multipliers {(jh
t )h∈[0,1],j1,t,j2,t}.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions (FONC) for optimal consumption allocation
reads
˜ uc(Ch
t ) = jh
t g′(Ch
t )+j2,t ∀h ∈ [0,1]. (A-18)
On the other hand, we have the relation jh
t = j1,t. Putting together the two
equations, we realize that individual consumption must be equalized
Ch
t = ¯ Ct ∀h ∈ [0,1]. (A-19)
The intuition is straightforward: For a given amount of available resources
and (strictly) concave utilities, the previous solution is a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition, which tells us that a social planner will (strictly) prefer to equalize
marginal utilities of consumption across agents.
The induced transfer system, denoted Ft⋆
(¯ t), can be recovered from the in-
40tertemporalhouseholdbudgetconstraintandwillbeproportionalto theinitialdebt
dispersion Ft⋆
(¯ t) µ F−1, with the constant of proportionality function of R⋆ and
P⋆. In fact, for each household we have
¯ th = ¯ bh
−1(1/P⋆−1/R⋆) ∀h ∈ [0,1]. (A-20)
In the second stage, we take Ft⋆
(¯ t) as given and we wish to ﬁnd an initial
degree ofpricedispersionD−1, such that therecursiveprobleminvolvesaconstant
policy.
However, under the optimal transfer scheme, we have shown that households
consume and work the same; this means that our second stage boils down to the
same problem solved in Benigno and Woodford (2004) which shows that zero
price dispersion (i.e., zero inﬂation) is the optimal long-run monetary policy.
Given no price dispersion, ¯ Dp = 0, we have
1 = ¯ p(z) = µ ¯ mc = µ ¯ w/ ¯ A. (A-21)
Because employment is subsidized at a rate tµ, which exactly offsets the mo-




= ¯ A. (A-22)
Thus, output is at its efﬁcient level





41Appendix E Loss Function
We recall that the resource constraint implies thatCt =Yt −Gt =Yt(1−tG
t ) at all
times. We start with the utility of consumption
u(Ch
t ) = u(
Ch
t
Ct (Yt −Gt)) ≃ (A-24)
≃ ¯ u+uc(¯ Y − ¯ G)( ˜ Ch
t +.5 ˜ Ch2
t )+uc¯ Y(ˆ Yt +.5ˆ Y2
t )+.5ucc¯ Y2[(1−¯ t)2 ˜ Ch2
t + ˆ Y2
t ]
+(uc¯ Y +ucc¯ Y(¯ Y − ¯ G)) ˜ Ch
t ˆ Yt −ucc¯ Y ¯ Gˆ Yt ˆ Gt −[uc+(¯ Y − ¯ G)ucc] ¯ G ˆ Gt ˜ Ch
t +t.i.p.
where ˜ Ch
t ≡   Ch
t /Ct. Rearranging and integrating with respect to households and






t +h.s.o., we get42
R 1
0 u(Ch
t ) = (A-25)




t ]+uc¯ Ys¯ tGˆ Yt ˆ Gt =
=t.i.p.+uc¯ Y[ˆ Yt +(1−s)ˆ Y2




We deﬁne ˜ Nh
t ≡ ˆ Nh







t ; and, from the labor supply conditions, we realize that in a second-
order approximation, ˜ Nh2
t ≃ s2
j2 ˜ Ch2
t . Using this last fact we write the quadratic
42In the text, we made use of labor supply dispersion Dn,t. However,in the derivationof the loss
function, we prefer to work with ˜ Ch
t . It is nonetheless not difﬁcult to see how Dn,t would enter into
the loss function derivation: Just note that we can writeCh
t = (Yt −Gt)(Nh
t /Nt)−j/s/Dn,t.
42approximation of the disutility of labor:
R 1
0 v(Nh





























t dh] = t.i.p+
+vn
¯ Y





where we deﬁne j ≡ j/ ¯ A and use Ez[ˆ yt(z)2] = (Ezˆ yt(z))2+Vhˆ yt(z).
Wemakeuseofthefact that ˆ Yt =Ezˆ yt(z)+.5(1−1/q)Vzˆ yt(z)and (Ezˆ yt(z))2 =
ˆ Y2
t and also that ˆ AtEzˆ yt(z) = ˆ At ˆ Yt (being terms of order higher than the second).






¯ A[ˆ Yt +.5(1+j)ˆ Y2





Using the steady-state relation uc = vn/ ¯ A, we can combine both the expres-
sions we have found (up to a multiplicative constant) to deﬁne the loss function
we were looking for:
Lt = (A-27)
= (s+j)ˆ Y2
t −2(s+j)ˆ Yt ˆ YN









We have used the fact that (s+j)ˆ YN
t = (1+j) ˆ At +s¯ tG ˆ Gt and the output gap
deﬁnition xt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ YN
t . Then, knowing that Vzˆ yt(z) = q2Vz ˆ pt(z) and following








where k ≡ (1−y)(1−by)(s+j)/y/(1+jq) is the Phillips curve parameter,
while lx ≡ k
q and lc ≡
(1−y)(1−by)
(1+jq)y s(1−¯ tG+s/j).
If wewanted to use h(h)we would simplyobservethat when h(h)=1/uc(Ch)
we have h(h)vn(Nh)/A = h(h)uc(Ch) = 1. Hence, all the results would hold up
to a multiplicative constant.
Appendix F Discussion of Aggregation
Krusell and Smith (1998) shows that in an economy with incomplete market, id-
iosyncraticincomeshocks,andanasset(capital)availableforpartialself-insurance,
anapproximateaggregationresultholds. Intheirwords, “...allaggregatevariables–
consumption, the capital stock and relative prices–can be almost perfectly de-
scribed as a function of two simple statistics: the mean of the wealth distribution
and the aggregate productivity shock”. Moreover, the marginal propensity to save
out of current wealth is almost completely independent of the levels of wealth and
labor income (even with leisure choice).
Den Haan (1997), in a setup similar to ours, shows that, without tight borrow-
ing constraints, policyfunctionsare almostlinearand changes ofasset distribution
on prices have much smaller effects than those implied by aggregate shocks. For
example, even if the stationary level of interest is shifted by wealth heterogene-
ity (as Hugget 1993 shows in relation to the low risk-free puzzle), the percentage
changes during business cycle ﬂuctuations are mainly driven by aggregate shocks.
44The previous results suggested my conjecture that variations in the cross-
sectional distribution of assets are of minor order with respect to variations in
the other endogenous state variables. In this model, in fact, the ﬁrst moment of
the asset distribution–which is a ”sufﬁcient statistics” in Krusell and Smith–is
constant by construction. Second and higher moments do affect endogenous vari-
ables; however, their stationary levels rather than their oscillations around those
levels, are what matters most in my welfare analysis.
Appendix G The Natural Debt Limit
Imposing Ch
t ≥ 0 and Nh
t ≤ ¯ N+ implies the emergence of what Aiyagari (1994),
in a slightly simpler context, calls a natural debt limit. We want to solve the
budget constraint forward, imposing the “worst possible scenario” for repaying a
contracted debt. Overall possiblerealizations, let b=minRt+k, TG =minTG
t and
w = minWr
t . Also set Pt = 1 ∀t ≥ 0. Call y = w ¯ N−TG.
The budget constraint can now be written as
−bh
t−1(1−bL−1) = y+¯ th. (A-29)
Let fb ≡ y/(1−b) and recall that ¯ th = −¯ bh(1−b) and ˜ bh
t = bh
t − ¯ bh. We can
now write
˜ bh





So taking −fb as the natural borrowing limit means that everybody has the
same limit when the problem is formulated in deviation from the steady state, and
45that the mass of agents hitting the limit in the stationary equilibrium is zero.














The budget constraint takes the form
PtCh
t +EtBh




where Bt is a set of state-contingent securities that pays $1, while Qt,t+1 is the
pricing kernel.










, ∀(h,ho) ∈ [0,1]2. (A-32)
In the next proposition, we claim that there exists an average household.
Proposition 2 For any continuous initial distribution of wealth, ∃ho ∈ [0,1] such
thatCho
t =Ct ∀t ≥ 0






























which shows the above proposition.
We can now introduce a metric for deviations of households’ consumption














Thus, under complete markets, Dn,t is constant.
To determine the value of this constant, we must specify the initial wealth,
hence the transfer scheme.
We can always ﬁnd a transfer scheme such that d(h) = 1 ∀h ∈ [0,1].
This would also be the optimal scheme that a benevolent government would
implement, weighting all households the same.
To ﬁnd this transfer scheme, we write the intertemporal budget constraint and
impose thatCh










t =Ct, it must also be that Nh
t = Nt, so that (considering that the
proﬁts equal the taxes for subsidies43) we have that Ct =WnNt. Thus, the budget
43The subsidy rate is constant, but total subsidies are not and are always equal to proﬁts.
47constraint reduces to
Bh



















If we deﬁne (1−b∗) = å
¥
t=0btE0uc,t/uc,0, we can write





Given that P0 = 1 is optimal in the case of no initial relative price distortion,
we set
¯ th = −bh
−1(1−b∗). (A-41)
Appendix I Optimal Monetary Policy, Flex Case
Here we give a proof of proposition (1).












t − ˜ bh
t−1+b˜ bh






















48Necessary conditions read (substituting out the interest rate ˆ Rt):
kc ˜ Ch
t − ˜ bh
t−1+b˜ bh
t − ¯ bh(brn
t +bEtpt+1−pt) = 0∀h ∈ [0,1] (A-42)
D ˜ Ch
t+1+jb˜ bh









2,t ∀h ∈ [0,1] (A-45)
R 1
0 ¯ bhlh




1,t = l3,t (A-47)
We multiply the ﬁrst four equations by ¯ bh and we integrate up with respect to
h. Using the deﬁnitions given in the text, we can write a bloc of the system as
kcwt −zh
t−1+bzh
t − ¯ bh(b ˆ Rt −pt) = 0 (A-48)
EtDwt+1+jbzt = 0 (A-49)
lcwt = kcl1,t −l2,t +b−1l2,t−1 (A-50)
Etl1,t+1−l1,t = jbl2,t/b (A-51)
l1,t = l1,t−1. (A-52)
If our solution is correct, then zb(b ˆ Rt −pt) = bzt −zt−1. So equation A-12
can be written (for every t ≥0) as kcwt =−bzt +zt−1+bzt −zt−1 =0. Given that
wt = 0 ∀t ≥ 0, then from equation (A-13) we also have zt = 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
From equation (A-16) we have that the ﬁrst multiplier must be constant l1,t =
l1,−1 and l3,t = bl1,−1. Using equation (A-15), this means that l2,t = 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
49Hence, by the last unused equation (A-14), we must also have that for all t ≥1
0 = lcwt = kcl1,−1−l2,t +l2,t−1/b = kcl1,−1,
which implies l1,−1 = 0. Now it is also straightforward to see that l2,−1 = 0.
So the system is satisﬁed and the initial values of the cross-Lagrange multipliers
consistent with our solution are exactly li,−1 = 0.
Appendix J Non-linear Solution Flex Case





























t = 0 given bh
−1 = ¯ bh∀h ∈ [0,1]. (A-57)




3, µ. Given a transfer scheme th = −gh¯ bh and assuming lh
2,−1 = 0, it can be






t = ¯ bh, Ch
t =Ct, Nh
t = Nt, (A-59)
lh
2,t = lh
3,t = 0, lh
1,t =C−s
t . (A-60)
When gh = (1−b), we have Rt = Pt
1−(1−b)Pt, which, in a ﬁrst-order approxi-
mation is ˆ Rt ≃ 1
bpt—the result of section 4.3 for z−1 = 0.
If bh







Appendix K Budget Constraint Derivation
The resource constraint for our economy without capital accumulation, which is
simplyCt = (1−tG
t )Yt, can be written as
Ct =Wr
t Nt +Ft −Gt. (A-62)
Thus, we can subtract the resource constraint (A-26) from the household h
budget constraint equation (1):
Ch
t −Ct + ˜ bh
t−1/Rt = ˜ bh
t−1/Pt +Wr
t (Nh







44First order conditions are not shown for brevity.
51Taking a linear expansion of this equation around the steady state of the deter-
ministic model, we have
˜ Ch
t +b˜ bh
t = ˜ bh
t−1+ ¯ Wr ¯ N ˜ Nh
t + ¯ bh(b ˆ Rt −pt). (A-64)




t Dn,t, we can ﬁnd the
relation between that relates consumption and hours deviations:
j
s ˜ Nh
t = − ˜ Ch
t +
ˆ Dn,t.
In the case of sufﬁciently small exogenous disturbance, the term Dn,t will be




Thus, we can substitute ˜ Ch for ˜ Nh in equation (A-28) neglecting Dn,t
45 to get
kc ˜ Ch
t = ˜ bh
t−1−b˜ bh
t + ¯ bh(b ˆ Rt −pt), (A-65)
where kc = 1+ s
j.
Appendix L The System of First Order Necessary Conditions
In what follows we write the system of ﬁrst-order necessary conditions of the
policy problem of section (4) (the Lagrange multipliers associated with the con-
45We recall that in the steady state, we have offset the monopolistic distortion such that ¯ Wr ¯ N =
¯ A
tµ
µ ¯ Y/ ¯ A = ¯ Y. We further normalize the output to ¯ Y = 1.
52straints are µ1, µ2 lh
1 lh
2, respectively):
lxxt +kµ1,t +sµ2,t −sb−1µ2,t−1 = 0 (A-66)
pt +µ1,t−1−µ1,t −b−1µ2,t−1−l1,t = 0 (A-67)








1,t) = ˜ jblh
2,t. (A-70)
Using the deﬁnitions introduced in the paper (plus the analog for lh
1 lh
2), the
“aggregate” block of the system is
lxxt +kµ1,t +sµ2,t −sb−1µ2,t−1 = 0 (A-71)
pt +µ1,t−1−µ1,t −b−1µ2,t−1−l1,t = 0 (A-72)
µ2,t +bl1,t = 0 (A-73)
lcwt = kcl1,t −l2,t +b−1l2,t−1 (A-74)
b(Etl1,t+1−l1,t) = ˜ jbl2,t (A-75)
pt = bEtpt+1+kxt (A-76)
sEtDxt+1 = Rt −Etpt+1−re
t (A-77)
kcwt = −bzt +zt−1+z2
b(b ˆ Rt −pt) (A-78)
Etwt+1 = wt − ˜ jbzt. (A-79)
53Figures and Tables
Table 2: Efﬁcient Rate vs Reﬁnancing Cost
GOMP OSR IT
Std(x) 1.259 .617 .742
Std(re) .742 .742 .742
AutoCorr(x) -0.013 .953 0.863
AutoCorr(re) 0.863 0.863 0.863
Volatility and autocorrelations of the efﬁcient rate re and the reﬁnancing cost x under the optimal
policy and the baseline calibration.
Table 3: Optimal Simple Rules
Parameter fb = 10−6 fb = 10−4
hr 1.047 1.047
hp 4.241 2.331
The functional form used is ˆ Rt = hr ˆ Rt−1+hppt. The initial grid is [0,3]×[1,300] for hr and hp,
respectively. In that range, no indeterminacy issues arises. We subsequently use a ﬁner grid on
the neighborhood of the optimum previously found: [0.90,1.25]×[3.00,6.00],for fb = 10−6 and
[0.90,1.25]×[1.80,4.00],for fb = 10−4 with 20×40 points.
54Table 4: Monetary Policy Rule
Rule Code hr hp hx
GOMP - - - - - Optimal Rule
OSR(fb = 10−6) 1.047 4.24 0
OSR(fb = 10−4) 1.047 2.33 0
TR 0 1.5 .5
IT - ¥ - - -
Rules usedforthewelfarecomparison. ForOSR,TR,andIT,thefunctionalformis: ˆ Rt =hr ˆ Rt−1+
hppt +hxxt.
Table 5: Welfare Comparison. Baseline Calibration
Losses GOMP OSR TR IT
Ratios 1 1.25 4.69 1.49
Levels 6.046e-5 7.538e-5 1.053e-3 9.018e-05
Inﬂation 9.306e-6 5.346e-6 9.979e-4 0
Output Gap 2.943e-4 4.741e-5 3.001e-4 0
Cons. Disp. 1.908e-3 2.967e-3 2.055e-3 3.882e-03
fb = 10−6
The welfare loss is expressed in percentageterms with respect to the optimal rule, “Ratios”, and in
steady-state consumption, “Levels”. The last three rows show the discounted expected volatility
of the targets: inﬂation, output gap, and consumption dispersion. Once appropriately multiplied
by the loss function weights lx and lc, the sum of the targets gives the loss in levels.
55Table 6: Welfare Comparison. Higher bond adjustment costs
Losses GOMP OSR TR IT
Ratios 1 1.4 11.78 1.88
Levels 8.567e-5 1.244e-4 1.009e-3 1.611e-04
Inﬂation 1.872e-5 1.281e-5 9.979e-4 1.110e-11
Output Gap 5.919e-4 9.552e-5 3.004e-4 3.365e-12
Cons. Disp. 2.290e-3 4.707e-3 3.667e-3 6.934e-03
fb = 10−4
The welfare loss is expressed in percentageterms with respect to the optimal rule, “Ratios”, and in
steady-state consumption, “Levels”. The last three rows show the discounted expected volatility
of the targets: inﬂation, output gap, and consumption dispersion. Once appropriately multiplied
by the loss function weights lx and lc, the sum of the targets gives the loss in levels.
Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions
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Impulse response functions to a positive 100% shock to the efﬁcient real rate re
t . The Solid line
and diamonds represent a debt variance parameter, z2
b, of 18.31 and 2.34, respectively.
56Figure 2: Simulated Series




































Refinincing Cost vs Efficient Rate
Simulated disaggregateseries, under the baseline calibration, using 1,200 randomly-drawnhouse-
holds; 24 of them selected for plots. Initial values at steady-state values. No initial periods
discarded. Top left: debt deviations from long-run level ˜ bh
t for selected households, over time.
Top right: consumption to average consumption log-deviations ˜ Ch
t for selected households, over
time. Bottom left: debt levels bh
t for selected households, over time. Bottom right: unitary real
reﬁnancing cost b ˆ Rt −pt (blue line) and efﬁcient rate re
t (red line), over time.
57Figure 3: Distributions over Time





Debt Distribution over Time
Debt Levels












Consumption Distribution over Time
Consumption to average−consumption Log−deviations
 
 
Density functions over time t. Left panel: debt levels. Right panel: log-deviations of households’
consumption over average consumption ˜ Ch. Total periods T = 110. Solid black line initial dis-
tribution t = 0; colors fade from dark green to light green as t approaches T. In the right panel,
the initial distribution is degenerate (vertical black line). Densities are estimated using a normal
kernel-smoother function.




























































Rule functional form: ˆ Rt = hr ˆ Rt−1 +hppt. Panel A: baseline calibration. Panel B: higher ﬁ-
nancial adjustment costs fb = 10−4. For panels A and B, grids are [0.90,1.25]×[3.00,6.00] and
[0.90,1.25]×[1.80,4.00]with 20×40 points, respectively.
59Figure 5: Optimal Simple Rule
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refinancing cost  
Impulse response functions to a positive 100% shock to the efﬁcient real rate of interest re
t .
Baseline calibration. Simple rule: ˆ Rt = 1.0474 ˆ Rt−1+4.2414pt.
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